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RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIA: EXISTENCE
AND REPRESENTATION
ANUJ BHOWMIK AND JILING CAO
Abstract. In this paper, we continue to explore the equilibrium theory under
ambiguity. For a model of a pure exchange and asymmetric information econ-
omy with a measure space of agents whose exogenous uncertainty is described
by a complete probability space, we establish a representation theorem for
a Bayesian or maximin rational expectations equilibrium allocation in terms
of a state-wise Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This result also strengthens
the theorems on the existence and representation of a (Bayesian) rational ex-
pectations equilibrium or a maximin rational expectations equilibrium in the
literature.
1. Introduction
In modern economics, it has been desirable to introduce uncertainty to general
equilibrium theory, because modeling the market with uncertainty is of importance
for both academic signicance and realistic decision making. Toward this direction,
the Arrow-Debreu state contingent model in [11], which is an extension of the
deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model in [5, 19], allows the state of nature
of the world to be involved in the initial endowments and payo functions. For this
model, the issue of incentive compatibility does not arise, as all the information
available to agents is symmetric. However, for this model to make sense one must
assume that there exists an exogenous organization that forces the contract ex post.
Radner [21] extended the analysis of Arrow and Debreu by introducing asymmet-
ric information so that each agent is characterized by his own private information, a
state-dependent initial endowment, a state-dependent utility function and a prior.
The private information of an agent is modeled as a partition of the nite state
space, the initial endowment and allocations of each agent are assumed to be mea-
surable with respect to his own private information. This means that each agent
only knows the atom of his partition including the true state, but cannot distinguish
those states within the same atom when he makes decisions. Since each agent is
a maximizer of his ex ante expected utility function with respect to his prior, the
notion of a competitive equilibrium in this model is called a Walrasian expectations
equilibrium (WEE). Along this line, Yannelis [26] proposed a core concept, called
the private core. It was proved by Einy et al. in [14] that if we allow for free dis-
posal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy
has a WEE and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides
with the private core. However, Angeloni and Martin-da-Rocha [4] pointed out
JEL classication: D51; D82.
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that when feasibility is dened with free disposal, WEE allocations may not be
incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable. To resolve these prob-
lems, it is desirable to consider a framework without free disposal. In this direction,
Angeloni and Martin-da-Rocha [4] showed that results of Einy et al. in [14] are still
valid without free-disposal provided that prices are allowed to take negative value.
Moreover, they also proved that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is
incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are
enforceable. However, whether Vind's theorem in [25] is still valid in this framework
emerged as a question in [20]. Recently, this question was solved by Bhowmik and
Cao in [9].
In Radner's model in [21], the information revealed to agents by market prices
and possibility of agents' expectations of how equilibrium prices are related to
initial information are not considered. In [22], Radner rened this model and in-
troduced the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium by imposing on agents
the Bayesian (subjective expected utility) decision doctrine. Under the Bayesian
decision making, agents maximize their subjective expected utilities conditioned
on their own private information and also on the information that the equilibrium
prices generate. The resulting equilibrium allocations are measurable with respect
to the private information of each individual and also with respect to the informa-
tion the equilibrium prices generate and clear the market for every state of nature.
Conditions on the existence of a Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
were studied in [2, 3, 22], where some generic existence results were proved. In
this line, Einy et al. [13] studied the relationship between the set of REE allo-
cations and the ex-post core of exchange economies with asymmetric information,
and established a core-Walras equivalence theorem in terms of REE allocations and
the ex-post core. However, Kreps [18] provided an example that shows a Bayesian
REE may not exist universally. In addition, a Bayesian REE may fail to be fully
Pareto optimal and incentive compatible and may not be implementable as a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of an extensive form game, refer to [15] for more details.
The lack of existence and misbehavior of a Bayesian REE make it not a desirable
solution concept. Sun et al. [24] resolved those problems by providing a new
model. More precisely, they considered an asymmetric information economy with
a continuum of agents whose private signals are independent conditioned on the
macro states of nature. For such an economy, they proved the existence, incentive
compatibility and eciency for their new REE concept. In a recent paper [12],
de Castro et al. introduced another new notion of REE by a carefully examining
Krep's example of the nonexistence of a Bayesian REE. In this formulation, the
Bayesian decision making adopted in [2, 22] was abandoned and replaced by the
maximin expected utility (MEU), and agents maximize their MEU conditioned on
their own private information and also on the information the equilibrium prices
have generated. Contrary to a Bayesian REE allocation, the resulting maximin
REE allocation may not be measurable with respect to the private information
of each individual or the information that the equilibrium prices generate. The
existence of a maximin REE was established in [12] for an economy having nitely
many agents and states of nature. Solving an open problem posed in [12], Bhowmik
et al. [10] recently proved the existence of a maximin REE in an asymmetric
information economy whose space of agents is a nite measure space and the space
of states of nature is a complete probability measure space.
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In this paper, we continue to investigate the concepts of a Bayesian and a max-
imin REE in pure exchange economies with asymmetric information. Our economic
model is the same as that in [10], which has nitely many commodities, a measure
space with a complete, nite and positive measure as the space of agents and a com-
plete probability space as the space of states of nature. For such an economic model,
we provide a representation for an assignment to be a Bayesian or maximin REE
allocation in terms of a state-wise Walrasian equilibrium allocation. This result also
strengthens the theorems on the existence and representation of a (Bayesian) REE
or a maximin REE in [10], [12] and [13]. The rest of paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2, we set up our model, introduce the concepts of a Bayesian REE and
a maximin REE, and investigate basic relationships among them. In Section 3, we
discuss major techniques that lead to the representation of a Bayesian or a maximin
REE. The main result and its proof are also provided in this section. However, we
leave the detailed proofs of three technical lemmas in Appendix B. In the last
section, we summarize what we have achieved in this paper, compare our results
with some results in the literature, and also point out some future research. For
the reader's convenience, we provide some necessary mathematical preliminaries in
Appendix A.
2. Bayesian and Maximin Relational Expectation Equilibrium
In this section, we study two concepts of a rational expectations equilibrium
for a model of pure exchange economies with asymmetric information, namely a
Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium and a maximin rational expectations
equilibrium. In Subsection 2.1, we set up the economic model. The equilibrium
concepts are introduced in Subsection 2.2. Furthermore, we also provide some basic
results on relationships between these equilibrium concepts.
2.1. The model setup. In this subsection, we introduce a model of a pure ex-
change economy E with asymmetric information. The exogenous uncertainty is
described by a probability space (
;F ;P), where 
 is the set of all possible states
of nature, F is the -algebra denoting possible events, and P is a complete proba-
bility measure dened on F . The space of agents is a measure space (T;; ) with
a complete, nite and positive measure , where T is the set of agents, and  is the
-algebra of measurable subsets of T denoting coalitions whose economic weights
on the market are given by . The commodity space is the `-dimensional Euclidean
space R`. In each state, the consumption set for every agent t 2 T is R`+. Each
agent t 2 T is characterized by a quadruple (Ft; U(t; ; ); a(t; );Pt), where
- Ft is the -algebra generated by a partition t  F of 
 representing the private
information of agent t. It is interpreted as follows: if ! 2 
 is the state of nature
that is going to be realized, agent t observes t(!), the unique element of t that
contains !.
- U(t; ; ) : 
  R`+ ! R is the state-dependent utility function of agent t, repre-
senting his (ex post) preference.
- a(t; ) : 
! R`+ is the state-dependent initial endowment of agent t, representing
his physical resources.
- Pt is a probability measure on F , representing the prior belief of agent t.
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Thus, we can express the economy E as follows
E =

(
;F ;P); (T;; );R`+; (Ft; U(t; ; ); a(t; );Pt)t2T
	
:
The quadruple (Ft; U(t; ; ); a(t; );Pt) is called the characteristics of agent t. Note
that for each given ! 2 
, there is always a deterministic economy E (!) associated
with E , which is given by
E (!) =

(T;; );R`+; (U(t; !; ); a(t; !))t2T
	
:
In the deterministic Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie model, prices are vectors in R`+ n
f0g. Following standard treatment in the literature (e.g., [8]), price vectors are
normalized so that their sum is 1. In this paper, we use the symbol  to denote
the interior of the simplex of normalized price vectors, i.e.,
 =

p 2 R`++ : kpk1 = 1
	
:
A price system of E is an F -measurable function  : 
! , where  is equipped
with the Borel -algebra. Let () be the smallest -algebra contained in F and
generated by a price system . Intuitively, () represents the information revealed
by . The combination of agent t's private information Ft and the information
revealed by the price system  is given by the smallest -algebra Gt that contains
both Ft and (). Formally, Gt = Ft _ (). For any ! 2 
, let Gt(!) denote the
smallest element of Gt that contains !.
Following Einy et al. in [13], we call a function f : T 
! R`+ an assignment if
for every ! 2 
, the function f(; !) is -integrable on T . Note that, distinguishing
from the denition of an assignment in [13], here in our denition we do not require
that for every t 2 T , the function f(t; ) is F -measurable. If an assignment f is
also feasible, i.e., for all ! 2 
,Z
T
f(; !)d =
Z
T
a(; !)d;
it is called an allocation. For an assignment (resp. allocation) f : T 
! R`+, the
function ft = f(t; ) : 
 ! R`+ is called an assignment (resp. allocation) of agent
t. Let Lt be the set of all assignments of agent t. Indeed, Lt is precisely the set of
functions from 
 to R`+. Dene LREEt by
LREEt = fx 2 Lt : x is Gt-measurableg:
We shall call an element x in LREEt a rational assignment of agent t.
As interpreted in [12], the economy E extends over three time periods: ext ante
( = 0), intrim ( = 1) and ex post ( = 2). At  = 0, the state space, the
partitions, the structure of the economy and the price functional  : 
 !  are
common knowledge. This stage does not play any role in our analysis and it is
assumed just for a matter of clarity. At  = 1, each individual learns his private
information and the prevailing prices p(!), and thus learns Gt. With these in
his mind, the agent plans how much he will consume x(!). However, his actual
consumption may be contingent to the nal state of the nature, which is not yet
known by him. The individual agent only knows that one of the state !0 2 Gt(!)
will be realized. Therefore, he needs to make sure that he will be able to pay his
consumption plan x(!0) for all !0 2 Gt(!). Based upon this interpretation, the
budget set of each agent t 2 T is given by
BREE(t; !; ) = fx 2 Lt : h(!0); x(!0)i  h(!0); a(t; !0)i for all !0 2 Gt(!)g
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for any given state ! 2 
 and price system  : 
! .
Throughout the paper, the following standard assumptions will be used.
(A1) For each ! 2 
, a(; !) is -integrable such that
Z
T
a(; !)d 0.
(A2) a is 
F -measurable.
(A3) For each x 2 R`+, U(; ; x) is 
F -measurable.
(A4) for each t 2 T and each x 2 R`+, U(t; ; x) is Ft-measurable.
(A5) For each t 2 T , a(t; ) is Ft-measurable.
(A6) For each t 2 T and each ! 2 
, U(t; !; ) is continuous and increasing.
(A7) For each t 2 T and each ! 2 
, U(t; !; ) is strictly quasi concave.
Assumption (A1) has been commonly used in the literature, for instance, [8],
[10] [13] and [14]. It asserts that no commodity is totally absent from the market.
Assumptions (A2) and (A3) are similar to those in [10]. Assumptions (A4) and
(A5) require that each agent knows, respectively, his initial endowment and utility
function. Finally, (A6) and (A7) impose properties on the agents' utility functions.
The last four assumptions were used in [12] and [13].
2.2. Rational Expectations Equilibrium and Some Basic Facts. In this sub-
section, we rst introduce the concepts of a Bayesian rational expectations equi-
librium and a maximin rational expectations equilibrium. Then, we provide some
basic results on these concepts.
We start with the concept of Bayesian expected utility of an agent. Given a price
system  : 
!  of E , the Bayesian expected utility of an agent t 2 T with respect
to Gt at x 2 LREEt is dened by the conditional expectation EPt [U(t; ; x())jGt].
When 
 is nite, () is generated by a partition  of 
, and thus Gt is generated
by the partition t_. In this case, the value of EPt [U(t; ; x())jGt] (!) in a state
! 2 
 can be expressed as follows:
EPt [U(t; ; x())jGt] (!) =
X
!02t_(!)
U(t; !0; x(!0)) Pt(!
0)
Pt(t _(!)) ;
where t _(!) is the unique member of t _ containing !. In general, when

 is nite, we assume that for each t 2 T and each ! 2 
, Pt(!) > 0. The budget
correspondence B : T  
 R`+ is dened by
B(t; !; p) =

x 2 R`+ : hp; xi  hp; a(t; !)i
	
:
Obviously, B is a non-empty and closed-valued correspondence.
The following general denition, given in [10], is just an extension of the corre-
sponding concept in [2] and [22] from the case when 
 is nite to the case when 

may be innite.
Denition 2.1 ([10]). Given an allocation f : T  
 ! R`+ and a price system
 : 
!  of E , the pair (f; ) is called a Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium
(abbreviated as Bayesian REE ) of E if
(1) for each t 2 T , f(t; ) is Gt-measurable;
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(2) for each (t; !) 2 T  
, f(t; !) 2 B(t; !; (!));
(3) for each (t; !) 2 T  
,
EPt [U(t; ; f(t; ))jGt] (!) = max
x2BREE(t;!;)\LREEt
EPt [U(t; ; x())jGt] (!):
In this case, f is called a Bayesian REE allocation, and the set of such allocations
of E is denoted by REE(E ).
Next, we introduce the concepts of maximin utility and a maximin rational
expectations equilibrium. Given a price system  : 
 !  of E , the maximin
utility of an agent t 2 T with respect to Gt at x 2 Lt in state ! 2 
, denoted by
U

REE(t; !; x), is dened by
U

REE(t; !; x) = inf fU(t; !0; x(!0)) : !0 2 Gt(!)g :
Comparing with U

REE(t; ; ), the function U(t; ; ) is sometimes called the ex post
utility of agent t.
Denition 2.2 ([10], [12]). Given an allocation f : T  
 ! R`+ and a price
system  : 
!  of E , (f; ) is called a maximin rational expectations equilibrium
(abbreviated as maximin REE ) of E if
(1) f(t; !) 2 B(t; !; (!));
(2) for each (t; !) 2 T  
,
U

REE(t; !; f(t; )) = max
x2BREE(t;!;)
U

REE(t; !; x);
i.e., f(t; ) maximizes U

REE(t; !; ) on BREE(t; !; ). In this case, f is called a
maximin rational expectations allocation, and the set of such allocations is denoted
by MREE(E ).
In what follows, we provide some basic results on relationships among Bayesian
REE, maximin REE and Walrasian equilibria of E (!) for a given state ! 2 
. Our
rst result establish relations between Bayesian REE and maximin REE.
Theorem 2.3. Let (f; ) be a Bayesian REE of E . Under (A4)-(A6), (f; ) is a
maximin REE of E .
Proof. We need to verify that for each agent t 2 T and each state ! 2 
, f(t; )
maximizes U

REE(t; !; ) on BREE(t; !; ). Suppose that there exists an assignment
x 2 BREE(t; !; ) for some (t; !) 2 T  
 such that
U

REE(t; !; x) > U

REE(t; !; f(t; )):
Since f(t; ) is Gt-measurable, under (A4) and (A6), U(t; ; f(t; )) must be Gt-
measurable. This means that U(t; ; f(t; )) is constant on Gt(!), and thus
U

REE(t; !; f(t; )) = U(t; !; f(t; !));
which implies U(t; !; x(!)) > U(t; !; f(t; !)). Dene h : 
! R`+ by
h(!0) =
(
x(!); if !0 2 Gt(!);
a(t; !0); otherwise.
The denition of h and (A5) imply h 2 BREE(t; !; ) \ LREEt . Again, under
(A4) and (A6), U(t; ; x()) is constant on Gt(!) for any Gt-measurable function
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x : 
 ! R`+. Thus, in this case, the Bayesian expected utility is equal to the ex
post utility. It follows that
EPt [U(t; ; f(t; ))jGt] (!) = U(t; !; f(t; !))
and
EPt [U(t; ; h())jGt] (!) = U(t; !; x(!));
which implies that
EPt [U(t; ; h())jGt] (!) > EPt [U(t; ; f(t; ))jGt] (!):
However, the last inequality contradicts with the fact that (f; ) is a Bayesian REE
of the economy E . 
Finally, we establish relationships between Bayesian or maximin REE of E and
Walrasian equilibria of E (!), refer to [16] for the denition of a Walrasian equilib-
rium in a deterministic economy.
Theorem 2.4. Let (f; ) be a Bayesian or maximin REE of E . Under (A4)-(A6),
for each ! 2 
, (f(; !); (!)) is a Walrasian equilibrium of E (!).
Proof. By Theorem 2.3, we only need to verify the case that (f; ) is a maximin
REE of E . Fix an ! 2 
. Let t 2 T and x 2 B(t; !; (!)). Dene a function
g : 
 ! R`+ by g(!0) = x for all !0 2 
. It is obvious that  is Gt-measurable.
Under (A5), a(t; ) is Ft-measurable and thus is Gt-measurable. Thus,  and a(t; )
are constant on atoms of Gt. It follows that a(t; !0) = a(t; !) and (!0) = (!) for
all !0 2 Gt(!). Thus B(t; !0; (!0)) = B(t; !; (!)) for all !0 2 Gt(!), which means
g 2 BREE(t; !; ). Since (f; ) is a maximin REE of E ,
U

REE(t; !; f(t; ))  U

REE(t; !; g):
Under (A4) and (A6), U(t; ; h()) is Gt-measurable and thus is constant on Gt(!)
for any Gt-measurable function h : 
! R`+. It follows that
U(t; !; f(t; !))  U

REE(t; !; f(t; ))  U

REE(t; !; g) = U(t; !; x):
This means f(t; !) maximizes U(t; !; ) on B(t; !; (!)). Thus, (f(; !); (!)) is a
Walrasian equilibrium of E (!). 
For each ! 2 
, let W (E (!)) denote the set of all Walrasian equilibrium alloca-
tions of E (!). For convenience, let us dene
W A (E ) = ff : f is an assignment and f(; !) 2 W (E (!)) for all ! 2 
g:
By Theorems 2.3 and 2.4, under (A4)-(A6), we have the following relations:
REE(E ) MREE(E )  W A (E ):
Einy et al. [13] showed that under assumptions similar to ours, for an economy E
with nitely many states of nature, then REE(E ) = W A (E ). This means that
for economies with nitely many states of nature, Bayesian rational expectations
equilibrium allocations can be represented by assignments which are state-wise
Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Recently, de Castro et al. [12] showed that
under assumptions similar to ours, for an economy E with nitely many agents
and nitely many states of nature, every assignment in W A (E ) is in fact a max-
imin rational expectations equilibrium allocation. These motivate us to explore
the problem whether we can use state-wise Walrasian equalibrium allocations to
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represent Bayesian or maximin expectations equilibrium allocations in our model.
We shall consider this problem in the next section.
3. Representation of REE Allocations
In this section, we continue to study relationships among the concepts of ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium in Section 2. We establish the equivalence between
Bayesian REE and maximin REE. Furthermore, we also provide a representation
theorem for Bayesian or maximin REE allocations of an economy E in terms of
Walrasian equilibrium allocations of associated deterministic economies E (!). To
achieve this goal, we need to establish (joint) measurability of a Bayesian REE
allocation in Subsection 3.1.
3.1. Measurability of Bayesian REE Allocations. Assumption (A2) says that
a is 
F -measurable. Thus, there exists a sequence of 
F -measurable simple
functions fan : n  1g : T  
 ! R`+ which converges pointwise to a almost
everywhere. Dene a function  : ! R++ by
(p) = minfpk : 1  k  `g
for every p = (p1; :::; pk; :::; p`) 2 . For any (t; !; p) 2 T  
, let
(t; !; p) =
1
(p)
ka(t; !)k1 and n(t; !; p) = 1
(p)
kan(t; !)k1;
and then dene
b(t; !; p) = (t; !; p)1 and bn(t; !; p) = n(t; !; p)1;
where 1 denotes the vector in R` whose components are 1. By denition, we can
see that fbn : n  1g converges to b almost everywhere with respect to k  k1. Now,
for each n  1, we dene three correspondences Bn; B; C : T  
  R`+ such
that for any (t; !; p) 2 T  
,
Bn(t; !; p) =

x 2 R`+ : hp; xi  hp; an(t; !)i
	
;
B(t; !; p) =

x 2 R`+ : hp; xi  hp; a(t; !)i
	
;
and
C(t; !; p) =

y 2 R`+ : U(t; !; x)  U(t; !; y) for all x 2 B(t; !; p)
	
:
For any assignment f , we further dene two more correspondences Bf ; Df : T 

 R` by
Bf (t; !; p) = B(t; !; p)  f(t; !);
and
Df (t; !; p) = B(t; !; p) \ C(t; !; p)  f(t; !)
for all (t; !; p) 2 T 
. Obviously, B0 = B, where 0 denotes the zero function
on T  
.
To establish the  
 F -measurability of a Bayesian REE allocation, we shall
need the following three lemmas, whose proofs are presented in Appendix B.
Lemma 3.1. Under (A2), for each (t; !; p) 2 T  
,
LiBn(t; !; p) = LsBn(t; !; p) = B(t; !; p):
Lemma 3.2. Let f : T
! R`+ be an 
F -measurable assignment of E . Under
(A2), B
f : T  
 R` is lower 
F 
B()-measurable.
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Lemma 3.3. Let f : T
! R`+ be an 
F -measurable assignment of E . Under
(A2), (A3) and (A6), D
f : T  
 R` is lower 
F 
B()-measurable.
Theorem 3.4. Let (f; ) be a maximin REE of E . Under (A2)-(A7), f is 
F -
measurable.
Proof. It is given that a(t; ) and U(t; ; x) are Gt-measurable for all t 2 T and
x 2 R`+. Thus, analogous to Lemma 3.2, one can show that B(t; ; p) is lower Gt-
measurable for all (t; p) 2 T  . Since B(t; !; ) is Hausdor continuous and 
is Gt-measurable, Bf (t; ; ()) is lower Gt-measurable. Thus, an argument similar
to Lemma 3.3 shows that D0(t; ; ()) is lower Gt-measurable for all t 2 T . Under
(A7), D
0(t; ; ()) is a single-valued Gt-measurable function for all t 2 T . It is
claimed that D0(t; ; ()) = f(t; ) for all t 2 T . If not, there exists some (t0; !0) 2
T  
 such that D0(t0; !0; (!0)) 6= f(t0; !0). It follows that
U(t0; !0; D
0(t0; !0; (!0))) > U(t0; !0; f(t0; !0)):
Since D0(t0; ; ()) is Gt-measurable,
U

REE(t0; !0; D
0(t0; ; ())) = U(t0; !0; D0(t0; !0; (!0))):
Thus,
U

REE(t0; !0; D
0(t0; ; ())) > U

REE(t0; !0; f(t0; ));
which contradicts the fact that (f; ) is a maximin REE of E : Consequently,
f(t; !) = D0(t; !; (!)) for all (t; !) 2 T  
. As above, B(; ; ()) is lower
 
F -measurable. Thus, similar to Lemma 3.3, one can show that f is  
F -
measurable. 
3.2. A Representation Theorem. In this subsection, we identify a subset of
W A (E ) to represent Bayesian and maximin REE allocations in our economic
model. First, we present a converse of Theorem 2.3, with the appearance of an
additional assumption.
Theorem 3.5. Let (f; ) be a maximin REE of E . Under (A4)-(A7), (f; ) is a
Bayesian REE of E .
Proof. First, we claim that for all (t; !) 2 T  
 and all !0 2 Gt(!), we have
U(t; !; f(t; !)) = U(t; !0f(t; !0)):
If not, there must exist some (t0; !0) 2 T  
 and !1; !2 2 Gt0(!0) such that
U(t0; !1; f(t0; !1)) > U(t0; !2; f(t0; !2)):
It is clear that a(t0; !0) = a(t0; !
0) and (!0) = (!0) for all !0 2 Gt0(!0). Thus,
B(t0; !0; (!0)) = B(t0; !
0; (!0)), which means f(t0; !1) 2 B(t0; !0; (!0)) for all
!0 2 Gt0(!0). Dene g : 
 ! R`+ by letting g(!) = f(t0; !1) for all ! 2 
. Since
U(t0; ; g()) is constant on Gt0(!0),
U

REE(t0; !0; g) > U

REE(t0; !0; f(t0; )):
This is a contradiction to the fact that (f; ) is a maximin rational expectations
equilibrium of E .
Similar to Theorem 3.4, D0(t; ; ()) is a single-valued Gt-measurable function.
By the denition of a maximin REE of E , one has
U

REE(t; !; f(t; ))  U

REE(t; !;D0(t; ; ()))
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for all ! 2 
. Hence, it follows from the claim that
U(t; !0; f(t; !0))  U(t; !0; D0(t; !0; (!0)))
for all !0 2 Gt(!). Since D0(t; !0; (!0)) is the unique maximizer of B(t; !0; (!0)),
one has f(t; !0) = D0(t; !0; (!0)) for all !0 2 
. Consequently, f(t; ) is Gt-
measurable. To show that f is also a Bayesian REE allocation, let x 2 BREE(t; !; )\
LREEt be xed. Obviously,
EPt [U(t; ; f(t; ))jGt] (!) = U(t; !; f(t; !))
and
EPt [U(t; ; x())jGt] (!) = U(t; !; x(!)):
Since (f; ) is a maximin REE of E , under (A4) and (A6), one has
U(t; !; f(t; !)) = U

REE(t; !; f(t; ))  U

REE(t; !; x) = U(t; !; x(!)):
It follows that
EPt [U(t; ; f(t; ))jGt] (!)  EPt [U(t; ; x())jGt] (!)
holds, which shows that (f; ) is a Bayesian REE of E . 
The following lemma, called Aumann's measurable selection theorem in the lit-
erature, can be found in [1, p.608].
Lemma 3.6. Let (T;; ) be a complete nite measure space. If a correspondence
F : T  R` has a measurable graph with F (t) 6= ; for all t 2 T , then F admits a
measurable selection f : T ! R`.
Now, with the help of all previous lemmas, we are able to present and prove our
main theorem in this paper.
Theorem 3.7. Let f be an assignment of an economy E . Under (A2)-(A7), the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) f 2 REE(E ), i.e., f is a Bayesian REE allocation.
(ii) f 2MREE(E ), i.e., f a maximin REE allocation.
(iii) f 2 W A (E ) and f is 
F -measurable.
Proof. The equivalence of (i) and (ii) has been established by Theorem 2.3 and
Theorem 3.5. That (ii) implies (iii) is given by Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 3.4.
To complete the proof, we need to verify (iii) implies (ii). For this purpose, let
f 2 W A (E ) be  
F -measurable, and q : 
 !  be a price system such that
(f(; !); q(!)) is a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E (!) for all ! 2 
. Dene
the correspondence G : 
   L1(;R`) by G(!; p) = SDf (;!;p) for all ! 2 

and all p 2 . By Lemma 3.3, we have that Df is lower 
F 
B()-measurable.
Thus, Df (; !; p) admits a measurable selection, which is also integrably bounded
by a function h : T ! R+ dened by
h(t) = kb(t; !; p) + f(t; !)k2:
This implies that G(!; p) 6= ; for all (!; p) 2 
.
Claim. G is lower F 
B()-measurable.
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Proof of Claim. To verify this claim, let  : L1
 
;R`
  
   ! R+ be the
function such that for all g 2 L1
 
;R`

and (!; p) 2 
,
(g; !; p) = dist(g;G(!; p)):
By Theorem 8.1.4 in [6, p.310], we are done if we can show that (g; ; ) is F 

B()-measurable for all g 2 L1
 
;R`

. To this end, it suces to show that
(g; ; ) : 
   ! R+ is F 
 B()-measurable for every simple measurable
function g 2 L1
 
;R`

. Given a simple measurable function g 2 L1(;R`), we
consider   : T  
! R+ dened by
 (t; !; p) = dist
 
g(t); Df (t; !; p)

for all (t; !; p) 2 T  
 . Then,   is  
F 
B()-measurable, and for any
(t; !; p) 2 T  
 and any (; !; p) 2 G(!; p), we have
 (t; !; p)  kg(t)  (t; !; p)k2:
Thus,  (; !; p) is integrably bounded for all (!; p) 2 
  . We shall ver-
ify that
R
T
 (; !; p)d is equal to (g; !; p) for all (!; p) 2 
  . Indeed, ifR
T
 (; !0; p0)d < (g; !0; p0) holds for some (!0; p0) 2 
, we can pick some
" > 0 such that the following inequalityZ
T
 (; !0; p0)d+ "(T ) < (g; !0; p0)
holds. Next, we dene H : T  R` and  : T  R` ! R by
H(t) =

y 2 Df (t; !0; p0) : kg(t)  yk2   (t; !0; p0) + "
	
and
(t; y) = kg(t)  yk2    (t; !0; p0):
It is easy to see that  is 
B(R`)-measurable. Further, it follows that
GrH =

(t; y) 2 T  R` : (t; y)  "	 \GrDf (;!0;p0)
is 
B(R`)-measurable. By Lemma 3.6, H admits a measurable selection h : T !
R`, which satises
kg   hkL1 
Z
T
 (; !0; p0)d+ "(T ):
This is a contradiction, which means that
R
T
 (; !; p)d = (g; !; p) for all (!; p) 2

. Hence, G is lower F 
B()-measurable. 
Dene another correspondence F : 
   by F (!) = fp 2  : 0 2 G(!; p)g.
Since q(!) 2 F (!), we conclude that F (!) 6= ; for all ! 2 
 and GrF 2 F 
B().
By Lemma 3.6, F has an F -measurable selection  : (
;F ;P) ! . Since 0 2
G(!; (!)), f(t; !) 2 C(t; !; (!)) and f(t; !) 2 B(t; !; (!)). It follows that
h(!); f(t; !)i  h(!); a(t; !)i
and
h(!); f(t; !)i  h(!); a(t; !)i
for all (t; !) 2 T 
. Hence, h(!); f(t; !)i = h(!); a(t; !)i for all (t; !) 2 T 
.
Finally, it remains to verify that f(t; ) maximizes U

REE(t; !; ) on BREE(t; !; )
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for all (t; !) 2 T  
. To this end, let g : 
 ! R`+ be a function such that
g 2 BREE(t; !; ) and
U

REE(t; !; g) > U

REE(t; !; f(t; !))
for some (t; !) 2 T  
. Then, we have
U(t; !0; g(!0)) > U(t; !0; f(t; !0))
for some !0 2 Gt(!), which contradicts with f(t; !0) 2 C(t; !0; (!0)). 
4. Conclusion
Since 1970's, the study of equilibria of an economic system under uncertainty has
attracted many economic theorists and mathematicians. Several equilibrium con-
cepts have been introduced in the literature, e.g., a Walrasian expectations equilib-
rium, a (Bayesian) REE, and a maximin REE. However, the question whether there
is an equilibrium of these types and relevant questions have puzzled researchers in
this eld for a long time. Only in recent years, the answers to these questions have
been getting clear.
In this paper, we study the relationships among the set of Bayesian REE al-
locations, the set maximin REE allocations and the set of state-wise Walrasian
equilirium allocations in a fairly general model of pure exchange economies. Our
model of a pure exchange economy has a measure space of agents with asymmetric
information, and nitely many commodities.The exogenous uncertainty of agents is
described by a complete probability space. Each agent is characterized by a state-
dependent utility, a state-dependent initial endowment, his private information and
prior belief. Our main result claims that under appropriate assumptions, the set
of Bayesian REE allocations coincides with the set of maximin REE allocations.
Furthermore, these sets can be represented by a subset of state-wise Walrasian
equilibrium allocations, consisting of those jointly measurable allocations.
Our main result is similar to Theorem 4.3 in [13]. However, the economic model
in [13] allows free-disposal, while our model does not allows free-disposal. For the
economic model of a pure exchange asymmetric information economy with nitely
many agents, nitely many states of nature and nitely many commodities consid-
ered in [12], each state-wise Walrasian equilibrium allocation is jointly measurable
with respect to the counting measure. Thus, our main result extends the exis-
tence theorem, i.e., Theorem 4.1, in [12]. In addition, our main result not only
claims the existence of an MREE, but also identies MREE allocations. Thus, it
also strengthens Theorem 5.5 in [10]. However, it remains an open and interesting
question whether the set of Bayesian (maximin) REE allocations coincides with the
ex-post core in our economic model. An armative answer to this question will
allow us to establish a core-Walras type theorem in our economic model. We leave
this question for our future research.
Appendix A. Mathematical Preliminaries
Let R` be the `-dimensional Euclidean space, and K0
 
R`

be the family of non-
empty compact subsets of R`. In this paper, we use two equivalent norms k  k1 and
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k  k2 on R`, which are dened by
kxk1 =
X
1i`
jxij and kxk2 =
s X
1i`
jxij2
for each x = (x1; :::; xi; :::; x`) 2 R`. The pointwise order on R` is denoted by 
and R`+ denotes the positive cone of R`. For any two vectors x = (x1; :::; x`) and
y = (y1; :::; y`) in R`, the symbol x  y (or y  x) means that xk  yk for all
1  k  `. We write x < y (or y > x) when x  y and x 6= y, and x  y (or
y  x) when xk < yk for all 1  k  `. Let R`++ = fx 2 R`+ : x 0g. A function
u : R`+ ! R is called increasing if u(x) < u(y) for any x; y 2 R`+ with x < y, and
it is strictly quasi concave if
u(x+ (1  )y) > minfu(x); u(y)g
for any x; y 2 R`+ with x 6= y and any 0 <  < 1.
Let X be a non-empty set and (Y; %) be a metric space. A correspondence
F : X  Y from X to Y assigns to each x 2 X a subset F (x) of Y . Meanwhile, F
can also be viewed as a function F : X ! 2Y , where 2Y denotes the power set of Y .
Furthermore, F is called non-empty valued (resp. closed-valued, compact-valued)
if F (x) is non-empty (resp. closed, compact) subset of (Y; %) for all x 2 X. The
graph of F , denoted by GrF , is dened by
GrF = f(x; y) 2 X  Y : y 2 F (x) and x 2 X with F (x) 6= ;g:
For a point y 2 Y and a set A 2 2Y n f;g, we dene
dist(y;A) = inff%(y; a) : a 2 Ag:
The Hausdor metric H on K0
 
R`

is dened by
H(A;B) = max

sup
a2A
dist(a;B); sup
b2B
dist(b; A)

:
for any two A;B 2 K0
 
R`

, where R` is equipped with the Euclidean metric. For
equivalent denitions of H, refer to [6]. The Hausdor metric topology TH on
K0(R`) is the topology generated by H. For a closed subset M of R`, K0(M) and
the Hausdor metric H on K0(M) can be dened similarly. If Z is a topological
space, a correspondence F : Z  R` such that F (x) is nonempty and compact for
all x 2 Z is called Hausdor continuous if F : Z !  K0  R` ;TH is continuous.
This also holds when R` is replaced by a closed subset M of R`.
Let (
;F ;P) be a probability measure space and G a -algebra contained in F .
The conditional expectation of an integrable random variable U with respect to G
denoted by EP(U jG ), is a G -measurable random variable such thatZ
A
EP(U jG ) dP =
Z
A
U dP
for any A 2 G . It is a well known fact in Measure Theory that the conditional
expectation of an integrable random variable with respect to a given -algebra
exists and is unique, refer to [23].
Let fAn : n  1g be a sequence of non-empty subsets of R`. A point x 2 R` is
called a limit point of fAn : n  1g if there exist N  1 and xn 2 An for each n  N
such that fxn : n  Ng converges to x. The set of limit points of fAn : n  1g is
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denoted by LiAn. Similarly, a point x 2 R` is called a cluster point of fAn : n  1g
if there exist positive integers n1 < n2 <    and for each k an xk 2 Ank such that
fxk : k  1g converges to x. The set of cluster points of fAn : n  1g is denoted by
LsAn. It is clear that LiAn  LsAn, and both LsAn and LiAn are closed (possibly
empty) sets. If LsAn  LiAn, then LiAn = LsAn = A is called the limit of the
sequence fAn : n  1g. Note that LsAn = LsAn and LiAn = LiAn, where An is
the closure of An with respect to the Euclidean topology. Hence, if A is the limit of
fAn : n  1g, then A is also the limit of

An : n  1
	
. If A and all A0ns are closed
and contained in a compact subset M  R`, then LiAn = LsAn = A if and only if
fAn : n  1g converges to A in the Hausdor metric topology on K0(M), refer to
[1].
Let (T;; ) be a measure space and fFn : n  1g; F : (T;; )  R` be
correspondences. Recall that F is said to be lower measurable if
F 1(V ) = ft 2 T : F (t) \ V 6= ;g 2 
for every open subset V of R`. It is well known that a non-empty closed-valued
correspondence F : (T;; ) R` is lower measurable if and only if there exists a
sequence of measurable selections ffn : n  1g of F such that for all t 2 T ,
F (t) = ffn(t) : n  1g:
If all F 0ns are non-empty closed-valued, lower measurable and at least one of F
0
ns
is compact-valued, then
T
n1 Fn is lower measurable, refer to [17]. If (S;S ; ) is
another measure space and f : (T;; )  (S;S ; ) ! R` is jointly measurable,
then it is well known that
R
T
: f(; )d : (S;S ; )! R` is measurable. A selection
of F is a single-valued function f : (T;; ) ! R` such that f(t) 2 F (t) for all
t 2 T . If a selection f of F is measurable (resp. integrable), then it is called a
measurable (resp. an integrable) selection. Let SF denote the set of integrable
selections of F , and the integration of F over T in the sense of [7] is a subset of R`,
dened as Z
T
Fd =
Z
T
fd : f 2 SF

:
Moreover, F is called integrably bounded if there exists an integrable function g :
(T;; )! R` such that  g(t)  y  g(t) for all t 2 T and y 2 F (t). It is a known
that fact that if F is non-empty closed-valued and integrably bounded, then
R
T
Fd
is compact, [16]. LetM  R` be endowed with the relative Euclidean topology, and
(Y; %) be a metric space. It is known that a function f : (T;; ) M ! (Y; %) is
jointly measurable with respect to the Borel structure onM , if f(; x) is measurable
for all x 2M , and f(t; ) is continuous for all t 2 T .
Appendix B. Proof of lemmas in Section 3.1
In this appendix, we present detailed proofs for Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2 and
Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. It is evident that LsBn(t; !; p)  B(t; !; p). To show that
B(t; !; p)  LiBn(t; !; p), let x 2 B(t; !; p): If a(t; !) = 0 then x = 0, and thus
there is nothing to prove. Assume that a(t; !) 6= 0. There are two cases for
us to consider. First, hp; xi < hp; a(t; !)i. In this case, hp; xi < hp; an(t; !)i
for n  1 suciently large. Thus, x 2 Bn(t; !; p) for n  1 suciently large,
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which means x 2 LiBn(t; !; p). The second case is that hp; xi = hp; a(t; !)i.
In this case,


p;
 
1  1k

x

< hp; a(t; !)i for all k  1. Thus, for any k  1, 
1  1k

x 2 Bn(t; !; p) for n  1 suciently large. It follows that for any k  1,
dist
  
1  1k

x;Bn(t; !; p)

: n  1	 converges to 0 as n ! 1. Since f(1   1k )x :
k  1g converges to x as k !1, then fdist(x;Bn(t; !; p)) : n  1g converges to 0
as n!1. This means that x 2 LiBn(t; !; p). 
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Suppose that ffn : n  1g is a sequence of simple  
 F -
measurable functions converging pointwise to f almost everywhere with respect to
k  k1. For each n  1, consider a correspondence Bfnn : T 
 R` dened by
Bfnn (t; !; p) = Bn(t; !; p)  fn(t; !). By Lemma 3.1,
LiBfnn (t; !; p) = LsB
fn
n (t; !; p) = B
f (t; !; p)
for all (t; !; p) 2 T 
. Note that Bfnn is lower 
F 
B()-measurable for
all n  1. Fix an (t; !; p) 2 T  
. Since fbn + fn : n  1g converges to b+ f
almost everywhere with respect to k  k1, we can choose an N  1 such that
kbn(t; !; p) + fn(t; !)k1  kb(t; !; p) + f(t; !)k1 + 1
for all n  N . Put
 = max fkbn(t; !; p) + fn(t; !)k1; kb(t; !; p) + f(t; !)k1 + 1 : 1  n < Ng :
It can be veried readily that for all n  1,
Bfnn (t; !; p); B
f (t; !; p)  B(0; );
where B(0; ) denotes the closed ball in R` centered at 0 and with radius  with
respect to the norm kk1. Thus, Bfnn (t; !; p) converges toBf (t; !; p) in the Hausdor
metric topology on K0(R`). Since Bfnn : T  
   ! K0(R`) is  
 F 

B()-measurable, its pointwise limit Bf : T  
   ! K0(R`) is  
 F 

B()-measurable. Consequently, Bf : T  
   R` is lower  
F 
B()-
measurable. 
Proof of Lemma 3.3. By Lemma 3.2, B andBf are lower 
F
B()-measurable.
Thus, there is a sequence f'n : n  1g of  
 F 
 B()-measurable functions
from T  
 to R`+ such that for all (t; !; p) 2 T  
,
B(t; !; p) = f'n(t; !; p) : n  1g:
For each x 2 R`, let
(x) =

(t; !) 2 T  
 : x+ f(t; !) 2 R`+
	
:
Note that (x) 2 
F and (x) = T 
 if x  0. It is possible to have (x) = ;
for some x < 0. Let R = R [ f1g. Dene  : T  
 R` ! R by
 (t; !; x) =
(
U(t; !; x+ f(t; !)); if (t; !) 2 (x);
1; otherwise.
Thus, for all x 2 R`,  (; ; x) is  
F -measurable when R is equipped with the
-algebra B = B(R) [ fB [ f1g : B 2 B(R)g. It follows that  (; ; x)j(x) :
(x)! R is measurable for any x 2 R` with (x) 6= ;. For each n  1, dene the
function n : T  
 R` ! R by
n(t; !; p; x) =
(
U(t; !; 'n(t; !; p))   (t; !; x); if (t; !) 2 (x);
1; otherwise,
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and dene Zn : T  
 R` by
Zn(t; !; p) =

x 2 R` : n(t; !; p; x)  0
	
:
As done above, one can show that n(; ; ; x)j : ! R is 
F 
B()-
measurable for all x 2 R` with (x) 6= ;. Let W be an open subset of R` and put
W \ Q` = frm : m  1g. By (A6), Zn(t; !; p) \W 6= ; yields rm 2 Zn(t; !; p) for
some m  1. Consequently, we have
Z 1n (W ) =
[
m1
f(t; !; p) 2 T  
 : n(t; !; p; rm) 2 ( 1; 0]g
and thus Z 1n (W ) 2 
F 
B(). Thus, Zn is lower 
F 
B()-measurable.
It is now claimed that
C(t; !; p)  f(t; !) =
\
n1
Zn(t; !; p)
for all (t; !; p) 2 T  ! . Obviously, C(t; !; p)  f(t; !)  Tn1 Zn(t; !; p). Let
x 2 Tn1 Zn(t; !; p) be such that x =2 C(t; !; p)   f(t; !). So, (t; !) 2 (x) and
U(t; !; y) >  (t; !; x) for some y 2 B(t; !; p). Thus, U(t; !; 'n(t; !; p)) >  (t; !; x)
for some n  1, which is a contraction and the claim is veried. Since Bf is
compact-valued, Zn is closed-valued and
Df (t; !; p) = (C(t; !; p)  f(t; !)) \Bf (t; !; p);
Df is lower 
F 
B()-measurable. 
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